

NSC BRIEFING

DOCUMENT NO. 32-1703/04
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. II
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: 1-14-80
SER: 372044

31 October 1956

OUTLINE—HUNGARY AND POLAND

- I. With Soviet troops apparently at last withdrawing from Budapest, uneasy coalition ^{SOME OF THE} (between multiple "revolutionary committees" and Nagy regime) is ^{ATTEMPTING TO TAKE OVER} "Revolutionaries" clearly have upper hand.
 - A. Nagy has agreed to form new army, from insurgent units, under command of "Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee."
 - B. Nagy is also forming new multi-party government, has promised future general and free elections, ^(AND HAS CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM WARSAW PACT)
 - C. New provisional government should adhere to strongest wishes of insurgents, who will hold military control.
- II. Soviet troops normally stationed in Hungary probably will return to garrisons, sit there until ordered out of country by Moscow. Units from Rumania and USSR (at least 1 div. each) probably withdrawing already.
 - A. Moscow announced 30 Oct now prepared discuss troop withdrawals from Poland and Rumania, as well as Hungary.
 - B. Moscow faced clear choice in Hungary: either cease fire (and eventual withdrawal) or full-scale war against entire Hungarian nation.
 1. Latter would have necessitated massive reinforcement of Soviet forces already on scene.
- III. Internally, various Hungarian insurgent forces and "committees" represent whole spectrum political views...from "national" Communist to clearly anti-Communist.
 - A. Thus, insurgents had only two primary bases for unity: joint action in uprising and joint desire for Hungarian independence (including immediate Soviet troop withdrawal from entire country)

- B. Combat now no longer unifying factor and Soviet troop withdrawal now looks probable, so this temporary unity ^(DIMINISHING) now gone.
- C. Some insurgents will accept Nagy as compromise, others will resist; political maneuvering--already underway--may result in demonstrations between factions.
- IV. Insurgent demands began on 24 Oct--second day of uprising. Demands first publicized by regional governments (e.g. Miskolc, Győr) which had "free" radio stations. Demands mounted both in scope and intensity as fighting continued and Nagy regime gave in on point after point.
- A. In addition to basic demands--Hungarian independence and Soviet troop withdrawal--^{OTHER} basic demands from almost all insurgents were:
- i. End of symbols of Soviet control, e.g. red star and replacement with national symbols, e.g. Kossuth-coat-of-arms.
 - ii. Liquidation Communist security and secret police.
 - iii. Coalition government.
 - iv. Free elections.
- B. By 30 Oct, regime had promised to meet all these demands.
- C. Regime has not yet committed itself specifically on certain questions of time--had dodged dates for Soviet troop withdrawal, holding free elections.
- V. In Poland, Gomułka continues moving rapidly to consolidate his position.
- A. Gomułka has now reiterated several times that first and foremost interest is maintaining friendly alliance with USSR.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B. New Polish Government, however, does not feel bound to agree or act in concert with USSR on all foreign policy.

1. We expect this aspect Gomulka's policy to become increasingly evident, particularly in foreign loans, trade.

C. Domestically, Gomulka has started on measures to improve lot of average Pole, thus gaining support for regime. These include:

i. New electoral law.

ii. End to unjust judicial procedures.

iii. End to coercive collectivization.

iv. Steps toward accommodation with the Church.

D. In other moves, a purge of Gomulka's opponents in the party and armed forces is underway, with eleven prominent party organizations ^{LEADERS} removed so far.

1. Press reports indicate that the Russian commanders of the Polish air force and the Warsaw garrison have been dismissed.

ii. Confirmation of Marshal Rokoszkowski's departure "on leave" suggests that he, too, is to be purged.

VI. Implications of Hungary and Poland for Soviet policy (summary of crash National Intelligence Estimate):

A. For Sov domestic policy: - leadership probably will not drastically reverse course of Sov internal relaxation, which has significantly improved party and popular morals.

B. Leadership: - Hungarian revolt may precipitate changes.

C. Foreign Policy: - Soviets are unlikely to abandon sweet-faced foreign policy.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- B. Policy toward Satellites:** - Unlikely that USSR will find it feasible to impose on Satellites for any long period a Stalinist system of rigid police and ideological controls.
- i. For present, Soviets will probably endeavor to prevent further outbreaks in Satellites, by insisting on precautionary police measures.
 - ii. For long run, Soviets will probably hope to maintain Communist regimes which, despite larger measures of internal autonomy, will be solid Soviet allies.

~~SECRET~~

-4-